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Abstract
We investigate private and social incentives for standardization to ensure market-
wide system compatibility in a two-dimensional spatial competition model. We
develop a new methodology to analyze competition on a torus and show that there
is a fundamental conflict of interest between consumers and producers over the stan-
dardization decision. Consumers prefer standardization with full compatibility be-
cause it offers more variety that confers a better match with their ideal specifications.
However, firms are likely to choose the minimal compatibility to maximize product
differentiation and soften competition. This is in sharp contrast to the previous
literature that shows the alignment of private and social incentives for compatibility.
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1. Introduction
This paper reexamines the incentives for firms to achieve standardization that
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model. To analyze such an issue, we consider a systems market comprised of two
complementary products to be used on a one-to-one basis. We construct a “torus”
model to represent two-dimensional spatial competition. The torus model allows
characterization of a symmetric equilibrium with more than two firms, as the circular
city model does in a one dimensional product space. We develop a novel approach
to analyze competition on a torus and show that there is a fundamental conflict of
interest between consumers and producers over the standardization decision. Con-
sumers prefer standardization with full compatibility because it offers more variety
that confers a better match with their ideal specifications. However, firms are likely
to choose the minimal compatibility to maximize product differentiation and soften
competition. This is in sharp contrast to the previous literature that shows the align-
ment of private and social incentives for compatibility (Economides, 1989; Matutes
and Regibeau, 1988).
Consider a situation in which all firms in the market are integrated in the sense
that they produce both component products. One important decision for them is
whether or not to make their components compatible with those of their rivals. In
the case of the home audio industry, for instance, full industry-wide compatibility
prevails, which allows consumers to combine a receiver of any brand with speakers
of any other brands. In the smartphone industry, however, we have incompatibility
in the sense that any “apps” developed for the Android operating system cannot be
used for any phone based on iOS, the operating system developed by Apple, and vice
versa.1
The issue of compatibility choice has been studied extensively. The literature on
this has addressed two main questions: Do firms have incentives to achieve compat-
ibility across components made by different producers? Is the market compatibility
choice socially optimal? Major contributors on this subject, in particular Matutes
and Regibeau (1988) and Economides (1989), answered positively to both questions,
demonstrating the alignment of private and social incentives for compatibility in
the absence of network effects. In particular, Matutes and Regibeau (1988) con-
sider a two-stage game in which two fully integrated firms make their compatibility
decisions prior to competition in prices. They show that the equilibrium entails
1System markets are often characterized by indirect network effects or inter-group network ex-
ternalities. Implications of network effects in this set-up has been extensively analyzed in the
framework of two-sided markets (see, for instance, Armstrong, 2006 and Rochet and Tirole, 2006).
In this paper, we analyze incentives to maintain product compatibility in the absence of network
externalities to isolate the effects of compatibility on competitive pricing. This also facilitates
comparison of our results to the existing literature pioneered by Matutes and Regibeau (1988) and
Economides (1989).
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full compatibility between component products of the two rival firms because com-
patibility leads to higher prices than incompatibility. Compatibility also leads to
higher social welfare due to the increased variety of systems available. Economides
(1989) extends Matutes and Regibeau’s analysis by considering a more general case
of n(≥ 2) firms. He reconfirms that compatibility prevails in equilibrium, because
compatibility leads to higher prices and profits than incompatibility. However, as we
explain below, Economides’ conclusion is based on an inconsistent analysis, which
we intend to rectify in this paper. To this end, we develop a torus model that allows
more than two firms to be located symmetrically. We demonstrate that Matutes
and Regibeau’s results are limited to the special case of two firms and not robust to
changes in the number of firms, overturning the conclusion of Economides (1989).
To analyze the desirability of compatibility across different producers of each
component products, we adopt the framework of Matutes and Regibeau (1988) to
facilitate the comparison of results. However, we modify it to maintain symmetry
across system products in a more general case with more than 2 varieties for each
component. More precisely, we consider a system good market which consists of two
differentiated component goods, called A and B, such as hardware and software.2
We search for symmetric equilibria with n producers in each of the two differentiated
component-markets. The distribution of consumers’ preference is modeled as a
uniform distribution on a torus, the Cartesian product of two circles.
With a general number of firms in the market, we need to deal with a large number
of compatibility possibilities across the two components and location choices for each
system variety. In this paper, we focus on two polar cases. Compatibility is the
case where any component in market A is compatible with any component in market
B. For instance, this may be an outcome of industry-wide standardization efforts
that ensures interoperability between any components that adhere to the industry
standard. The other case we consider is the minimum level of compatibility in
which one particular variety of component A is compatible with only one variety
of component B, and vice versa. We call this regime incompatibility under which
no mix-and-match is possible. We consider two alternative market structures, one
in which all firms are vertically integrated multi-product firms that produce both
components, and one in which each firm is vertically separated and produces only
one component. In the integrated firm case, incompatibility would arise if each firm
produces a closed system. In the vertically separated firm case, this would arise
if each firm has a proprietary technology and firms in market A form an exclusive
partnership with partner firms in market B.
2See Katz and Shapiro (1994) for a discussion of economic issues in systems markets.
3
We show that for all n ≥ 4, firms prefer incompatibility to compatibility in the
integrated firm case (whereas the same holds for n ≥ 3 in the vertically separated
firm case).3 In contrast, social welfare is maximized under compatibility. This implies
that the alignment of private and social incentives towards compatibility in Matutes
and Regibeau is a special result that applies to only n = 2, and is not robust to
changes in the number of firms.
The logic behind our results is simple and can be explained in geometric terms.
First, under compatibility there are n2 systems available while there are only n sys-
tems available under incompatibility. As a result, it is more costly for an individual
consumer to change his choice under incompatibility because the second best alter-
native tends to be farther away from his ideal specification than in the compatibility
regime. Second, the measure of marginal consumers (those who are indifferent be-
tween two alternatives) is usually smaller under incompatibility. This implies that
the marginal gains from a price cut, or equivalently the firms’ price cutting incen-
tives, are smaller. Taken together, firms have incentives to produce closed systems
or engage in exclusive partnerships that result in incompatibility in order to reduce
the intensity of price competition. In particular, we make a novel methodological
innovation that provides a clean characterization of the dependence of price com-
petition on the location of competing products in a two-dimensional product space.
We show that the intensity of price competition in the market is completely char-
acterized by and is inversely related to a simple parameter called the m-to-d ratio,
which is a ratio of the measure of marginal consumers to the extent of product differ-
entiation. This parameter operationalizes the notion of the principle of maximum
differentiation in a two dimensional product space. On the other hand, as is well-
understood in the literature, compatibility is desirable for the consumers and for the
whole economy since it reduces consumers’ “transportation costs” by increasing the
variety of systems available in the market.
It is worth mentioning that Economides (1989) analyzed essentially the same
problem we are considering in this paper. His analysis, however, was logically
inconsistent by implicitly considering two topologically different manifolds to repre-
sent the same market – sphere and torus – when he compared two different regimes.4
More specifically, he assumed on one hand that consumers are uniformly distributed
3Monroe (1993) shows by example that the comparison of industry profits across regimes is
ambiguous for n > 4 and depends on firms’ locations in product space, but does not provide a
systematic analysis as we do.
4We are not the first one to notice this error. Matutues and Regibeau (1991) and Farrell,
Monroe, and Saloner (1998) also point out the error, but do not pursue the matter further.
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on a surface of a sphere that has a great circle of length 1 (p.1167). On the other
hand, he represented the market on a two-dimensional plane (see Figure 1 in p.1169
of the paper) which is topologically equivalent (or homeomorphic) to a torus (Carte-
sian product of two circles) but not to a sphere.5 The analysis of the equilibrium
under compatibility (Section II) was based on the assumption that the market can
be represented as the two-dimensional plane. In the analysis of the equilibrium
under incompatibility (Section III), however, he assumed a sphere market: whereas
the distance between any two neighboring systems appears to be
√
2d in the two-
dimensional plane (Figure 1), that distance is taken as d (as opposed to
√
2d) in the
analysis in Section III. This would be the case on the surface of the sphere where
the length of a diagonal circle is the same with that of a horizontal circle or a vertical
circle. But that is not the case in the plane representation.
Even if we ignored this technical problem, Economides’s analysis would still ap-
pear problematic, because as shown in this paper, how the products are located on
the characteristics space matters. Without an inquiry of whether the equilibrium
profits would depend on the locations of the products, he prematurely assumed that
the system goods are located on the diagonal. The comparison under this locational
formation of the products may not be fair. For the compatibility case there is no
other formation that enhances the equilibrium profits, but for the incompatibility
case there is. As a result, he mistakenly concluded that the Matutes and Regibeau
result extends for the general n firm case, with private and social incentives aligned.
In contrast, we show in this paper that firms may prefer incompatibility, because un-
der incompatibility they can increase profits by differentiating their products from
others.
Our paper mainly contributes to the literature on spatial competition models
of compatibility, but also relates to other branches of research including products
bundling (e.g. Chen, 1997; Choi, 1996; Denicolo, 2000; Matutes and Regibeau,
1992; Nalebuff, 2004), exclusive dealing (e.g. Besanko and Perry, 1994) and vertical
organization of industry in general (Farrell et al., 1998). In our analysis, we consider
two alternative market structures. One is where all firms are integrated in the sense
that they produce both components of the system. The other case is where all
firms produce only one component. Depending on the market structure, our model
can also be reinterpreted as an analysis of the incentives for firms to engage in
bundling or exclusive dealing arrangements. In the integrated firm case, the effect
of incompatibility is equivalent to that of bundling in that consumers are forced
5For an explanation about homeomorphic relations among two-dimensional manifolds, we refer
interested readers to Massey (1991).
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to buy the whole system from the same vendor. In the one-component producer
case, incompatibility is equivalent to exclusive dealing between a pair of partner
firms. For instance, if we reinterpret two component products as a final good
and retailing service, respectively, our model can be considered as an analysis of
incentives for exclusive dealing contracts. In this context, our paper also provides a
useful framework to analyze incentives to engage in bundling decisions or exclusive
dealing arrangements in system markets.
Finally, our paper is closely related to Zhou (2014) who analyzes incentives for
bundling with an arbitrary number of firms as in our paper. He shows that under
fairly general conditions, bundling raises market prices compared to separate sales
when the number of firms exceeds a threshold level. Bundling in his model is
equivalent to the regime of incompatibility in our model with vertically integrated
firms, whereas separate sales correspond to the regime of compatibility. His result is
thus consistent with ours even though it was derived from a very different framework.
More specifically, he adopts the random utility framework of Perloff and Salop (1985)
to model product differentiation in contrast to our spatial competition model. This
demonstrates that our main result is robust and not model-specific.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model of
differentiated system products in a toroidal two dimensional product space. In sec-
tion 3, we first consider integrated firms that produce both components. We analyze
market equilibria in two regimes, incompatibility without any mix-and-match possi-
bility, and full compatibility enabled by market-wide standardization. We derive the
market equilibrium in each regime and analyze incentives to achieve standardization
in the market. We show that under full compatibility, the market equilibrium in
each component market can be analyzed in isolation of the other component mar-
ket. As a result, the market equilibrium replicates the one in the classical circular
city model. We also characterize the equilibrium of price competition under any
symmetric configuration of product differentiation, which allows the comparison of
equilibrium profits under compatibility and under incompatibility. The analysis re-
veals a fundamental conflict of interest between consumers and producers over the
standardization decision. Section 4 contains a discussion about an alternative mar-
ket structure in which each firm produces only one component as a robustness check
of our main results. Concluding remarks follow.
2. The Model
Consider a market for system goods that consist of two component products,
A and B. We assume that these two component products can generate value only
6
Figure 1: Transforming a square into a torus
when they are combined together. To analyze the incentives to achieve compatibility
between the two components, we adopt a variation of Matutes and Regibeau (1988)
that accommodates more than 2 varieties in each component market while maintain-
ing symmetry among varieties. There are n (≥ 2) firms, each of which produces
the two components of a system, i.e., a single variety of component A and a single
variety of component B.6 To maintain symmetry, we adopt a torus to represent the
product space. Consumers have heterogenous preferences over the characteristics of
each component. Each consumer’s preference is summarized by her location which
represents her ideal variety (xA, xB) in the product space. The torus is constructed
by the following equivalence relations over R2.
(xA, xB) ∼ (xA + 1, xB) ∼ (xA, xB + 1) for any (xA, xB) ∈ R2
As shown in Figure 1, the torus is homeomorphic to the Cartesian product of two
circles, i.e. S1 × S1, thus is a natural two-dimensional extension of the circular city
model a` la Salop (1979).
With n (> 2) manufacturers for each component, we can imagine a plethora of
possibilities to the extent of which the component products are compatible with each
other, most of which are analytically intractable. Here, we just consider two polar
cases. In the first case, which we simply label as compatibility, any component A
is compatible with any arbitrary component B to make a feasible system. Under
compatibility, n2 systems are available in the market, which is the the maximum
number of varieties that can be assembled by the consumers. This case arises
if all manufacturers participate in a standard-setting organization, and establish
industry-wide standards that would allow “mix-and-match” between two components
from any producers. In the other extreme case of compatibility, which we call
incompatibility, a brand of component A can be matched only with the component
6In section 4, we also consider the case where each firm produces only one of the components,
and show that our main result is strengthened in this alternative market structure.
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B by the same producer.7 Incompatibility among different systems prevails if the
firms decide to make their components incompatible with their rivals’. Therefore,
under incompatibility, only n system goods, the least possible number of varieties,
are available to the consumers. Let us denote the set of component A by IA, and
similarly for B by IB. Also let IC be the set of system goods available in the market,
and (i, j) be its generic element where i ∈ IA and j ∈ IB. The size of IC is n2 under
compatibility, and n under incompatibility. As in Salop (1979), we assume that
all varieties are symmetrically located, and focus on symmetric equilibria in which
firms independently set the price of their own components, taking the compatibility
configurations and location choices as given.
Consumers are uniformly distributed on the torus. A consumer, who is at
(xoA, x
o
B) and purchases system (i, j) ∈ IC , derives net utility of
v − t[(xoA − xi)2 + (xoB − xj)2]− pAi − pBj ,
where v is the reservation value of the ideal system, which is common to all con-
sumers, t > 0 is a “transportation cost” parameter that represents the degree of
product differentiation, xi is the location of firm i on coordinate A, p
A
i is the price of
component A produced by firm i, and xj and p
B
j are defined similarly for component
B.8 Each consumer buys at most one unit of the system good that provides the
highest net utility. We assume that v is sufficiently large, and thus every consumer
makes a purchase in any equilibrium. Each firm’s marginal cost is normalized to
zero.
3. Market Equilibrium: Compatibility vs. Incompatibility
In this section, we derive the market equilibrium under compatibility and incom-
patibility to analyze incentives to achieve industry-wide standardization. Matutes
and Regibeau (1988) address the same question for the case of n = 2, and show the
alignment of private and social incentives for compatibility. We demonstrate that
their results are limited to the special case of two firms and not robust to changes in
the number of firms.9
7Alternatively, each firm provides an integrated system good of which components cannot be
disintegrated and rematched with other products in the market.
8We adopt a quadratic transportation cost in our analysis as in d’Aspremont et al. (1979).
However, any specification of transportation costs which is a monotonic transformation of the
Euclidean distance generates the same qualitative results.
9Matutes and Regibeau (1988) also analyze the case where the market is not fully covered.
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3.1. Equilibrium under Compatibility
Under compatibility, competition takes place at the component level. As a conse-
quence, the symmetric equilibrium is identical to that of the one-dimensional circular
city model. This can be easily shown by considering an individual consumer’s utility
maximization problem:
max
i∈IA, j∈IB
{
v − t[(xoA − xi)2 + (xoB − xj)2]− pAi − pBj
}
= v −min
i∈IA
{t(xoA − xi)2 + pAi } −min
j∈IB
{t(xoB − xj)2 + pBj }
In words, with compatibility that allows every component in A to be combined
with any component in B, the choice of each component can be made independently
of the other. Furthermore, each marginal distribution of consumers’ preferences is
uniform on a circle of length 1, since the preferences for A and B are jointly uniform
on the torus. Therefore, provided that the products in IA are equidistant from each
other along the (say, horizontal) coordinate xA and those in IB along the (vertical)
coordinate xB, there exists a symmetric equilibrium where all firms in the market
set their prices the same and share the market equally.
Note that every symmetric formation of the products on a circle yields the same
intensity of competition, which yields the same level of equilibrium profits. As
shown in the next subsection, however, this is not the case on the torus: there is
usually more than one way to symmetrically locate the products on the torus, and
each configuration yields a different level of equilibrium profits.
Since the component market B is structurally identical to market A, we just con-
sider the market for component A (horizontal circle) below. Suppose firm i, located
at the origin, charges pAi , and all the other firms charge the identical price p for their
component A. A consumer located at x is indifferent between purchasing from firm
i and purchasing from i’s closest neighbor if pAi − tx2 = p + t
(
1
n
− x)2. There are
two neighboring firms on the circle. Thus, the demand for firm i’s component A can
be written as
Di(p
A
i , p) = 2x =
1
n
− n
(
pAi − p
)
t
,
and the profit from component A as
pAi Di(p
A
i , p) = p
A
i
[
1
n
− n(p
A
i − p)
t
]
.
Differentiating with respect to pAi and imposing the symmetry condition that p
A
i = p,
we derive that the equilibrium price and the profit from component A are t/n2 and
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Figure 2: Two symmetric formations with n = 8
t/n3, respectively . Since a firm collects profits from both the A and B markets, the
total profit is twice as large as the profit from a component market.
Proposition 1. Under compatibility, the symmetric equilibrium price and profit are
given by pC(n) = t/n2 and piC(n) = 2t/n3, respectively.
3.2. Equilibrium under Incompatibility
Suppose now that each firm produces the components of a system that are incom-
patible with the other firms’ products. Since the number of available systems under
incompatibility is n as opposed to n2 (the number under compatibility), and because
each firm supplies a single good (i.e., an integrated system), our model is identical to
a two-dimensional circular city model with n identical firms. In what follows, with
a slight abuse of notation, we use the same notation for the firms and the systems
that they produce. As mentioned before, we focus on symmetric equilibria, but
there is in general more than one way to symmetrically locate the products on the
torus. Formally, we define a symmetric formation as a distribution of the feasible
systems on the torus, with which given the same system prices, the shape and size
of market areas are identical across the systems. Let zn be the set of all symmetric
formations for given n, and Fn be a generic element of it.
Figure 2 shows two examples of symmetric formations for n = 8, which yields
different equilibrium prices and profits. Note that all dots at the corners of the
square in the left panel represent the same system because (xA, xB) ∼ (xA+1, xB) ∼
(xA, xB + 1). By the same token, in the right panel the dots on the top boundary
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and the corresponding dots at the bottom represent the same systems. The shaded
areas represent the consumers purchasing one unit of goods from firm i, i.e., firm i’s
market areas.
Let Ni be the set of the neighboring systems of system i, where the neighboring
systems are defined as follows. In a symmetric equilibrium, j is a neighboring
system of i if there exists a set of consumers who are indifferent between i and j and
purchase either of the systems. In other words, the neighboring systems are direct
competitors who share a market boundary. As in the circular city model where a
firm has two direct competitors, in our torus city model, a system competes directly
against neighboring systems.
To characterize the equilibrium price and profit for any symmetric formation Fn,
let us introduce a few more definitions. Let m(i, j;Fn) denote the length of the
equilibrium market boundary between system i and its neighboring system j, and
let d(i, j;Fn) be the Euclidean distance between these two systems on the torus under
symmetric formation Fn. Using this notation, we define the m-to-d ratio, µ(Fn) for
an arbitrary firm i,
µ(Fn) =
∑
j∈Ni
m(i, j;Fn)
d(i, j;Fn)
which is the sum of the ratios of two orthogonal segments (see the left panel of Figure
2). The following proposition shows how this ratio relates to the equilibrium prices
and profits.
Proposition 2. Given a symmetric formation Fn, the unique symmetric equilib-
rium price and the corresponding profit under incompatibility are given by pIN(Fn) =
2t/[nµ(Fn)] and pi
IN(Fn) = 2t/[n
2µ(Fn)], respectively.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note first of all that the equilibrium price depends on the locational formation of
the competing products on the torus. More specifically, the proposition shows that
the intensity of price competition in the market is completely characterized by and
is inversely related to the m-to-d ratio µ(Fn) and the number of firms n. Intuitively,
the market boundary m(i, j;Fn) represents the measure of marginal consumers who
would respond to a small price change, meaning that a higher m(i, j;Fn) would lead
the firms to engage in more intense price competition. On the other hand, the
distance d(i, j;Fn) captures the extent of product differentiation between the two
competing systems i and j. The farther the two systems are located, the less substi-
tutable they become. Proposition 2 essentially states that the (symmetric) equilib-
rium profits increase as the location configuration induces shorter market boundaries
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and longer distances from each other. This result generalizes the principle of max-
imum differentiation in a one dimensional location model and is consistent with
Irmen and Thisse (1998) who show that firms seek the formation which generates
the smallest market boundary.10
The result can be further appreciated with the examples in Figure 2. The
products in the left panel are distributed more evenly over the space, while those in
the right panel are concentrated on two horizontal lines.11 Thus, we expect that
the price competition will be less severe, and therefore the equilibrium profit will
be higher with the formation on the left panel. Using Proposition 2, we can confirm
this intuition; the equilibrium profit generated from the formation on the left panel
is t/112, which is about 35% higher than t/152, the profit from the formation on the
right.
It is also noteworthy that the m-to-d ratio itself has little to do with the number
of firms n. That is, because the length of a market boundary is scaled by the
associated distance between the products, the ratio does not necessarily shrink down
to zero as n grows to infinity. Instead, the ratio depends crucially on the shape
of the market area; when the systems are distributed more evenly over the product
space, the shape of each market area becomes more round, as we can see again in
Figure 2. We can predict that when the shape of equilibrium market areas is more
round, its m-to-d ratio is lower, and thus the equilibrium profit will be higher.12
Since the equilibrium profit depends on the locational configuration, unlike in the
case of compatibility, it is inevitable to search for the profit-maximizing formations
for each n. As one can imagine, however, finding the profit-maximizing formation
among all symmetric formations is by no means easy. So, instead of characterizing
the exact maximum of equilibrium profits for each n, we construct an upper bound
on the minimum m-to-d ratios for an arbitrary n. This upper bound will later
be used to establish that for n ≥ 4, under incompatibility there exists at least one
formation that allows a profit higher than the equilibrium profit under compatibility.
To derive an upper bound for the minimum m-to-d ratios for a general n, we first
introduce a class of simple and tractable formations. Given n, the k-jump formation,
denoted by Jkn , is the formation in which every system product lies equidistantly on
10They state that “the lower the density of marginal consumers, the lower is the elasticity. Ac-
cordingly, as the consumer distribution is uniform, demand has minimal elasticity when the corre-
sponding hyperplane has minimal surface area.”
11Note again that the top and the bottom boundaries represent the same line in the torus.
12If, hypothetically, the market area is completely round (i.e., a disk), its m-to-d ratio would be
its circumference over its diameter, which must be approximately 3.141592.
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Figure 3: k-jump formation (left); a symmetric but not k-jump formation (right)
the line of slope k (with intercept zero) for some integer k (see the left panel of Figure
3).13 It is noteworthy that the examples in Figure 2 are k-jump formations with
n = 8 and k = 3 and 4, respectively. A k-jump formation is well defined for any n
and k, and is tractable because it is repetitive.
Note that there are formations which are symmetric but not k-jump. The right
panel of Figure 3 provides such an example. To make a contrast between k-jump
formations and the one in the right panel of Figure 3, we introduce another definition
that helps categorize the shape of market areas. Suppose that all firms charge the
same price while the market is fully covered. A regularly symmetric formation is
a symmetric formation in which (i) the number of the market boundaries of each
system is an even number, and (ii) for any parallel market boundaries of a system,
the distance from a market boundary to the system is the same as the distance
from any other boundary to the system. In other words, a regularly symmetric
formation has each system locate at the center of its market area. Then, it is
apparent that the formation depicted in the right panel of Figure 3 is an example
of a symmetric but not regularly symmetric formation. Below, we focus on regularly
symmetric formations, and let F ∗n denote the profit-maximizing formation among
13When k is a rational number, a formation can be defined in a similar way. But we do not
consider such cases here. If k is an irrational number, the line with slope of k never goes back to
an integer point. Thus, there does not exist a regularly symmetric formation in which systems are
located on a line with slope of an irrational number.
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Figure 4: The candidates for neighboring systems of the system at the origin in k-jump formation
for k ≥ 2; q is the quotient of the division of n by k, and r is the remainder, i.e., n = qk + r.
regularly symmetric ones.14
The following lemma states some useful facts about k-jump formations.
Lemma 1. For any natural number k, the following are true:
(i) k-jump formations are regularly symmetric.
(ii) With a k-jump formation, the shape of an equilibrium market area is either
a rectangle or a hexagon.
Proof. See the Appendix
Note that there exist regularly symmetric formations that are not k-jump. For
instance, consider a formation where each system is located at the nodes of a square
grid. This formation is well defined for any square number n, i.e., n = a2 for some
integer a ≥ 2, and is not a k-jump formation because there does not exist a single
line on which all products are located. This, together with the lemma, implies that
14We restrict our attention to regularly symmetric formations for two reasons. First, because
the irregular formations are, as the name suggests, irregular, full characterization of all possible
irregular formations is often intractable for large n. More importantly, although it is difficult to
show this formally, it is intuitively apparent that if a formation locates each system more closely to
one market boundary than the others, the formation is not the profit-maximizing one. Therefore,
we strongly believe that the set of profit-maximizing formations is a subset of that of regularly
symmetric formations.
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the set of k-jump formations is a subset of that of regularly symmetric formations
in general, and thus k-jump formations do not help us characterize a lower bound
of the m-to-d ratio. But it can still help provide an upper bound of the minimum
m-to-d ratio. Specifically, we construct an upper bound of the minimum m-to-d
ratio by considering k-jump formations, with k the largest integer that is smaller
than or equal to
√
n.
Lemma 2. For any n ≥ 2, the m-to-d ratio of the profit-maximizing formation
µ(F ∗n) must be smaller than 3
√
13.
Proof. See the Appendix.
3.3. Comparison between the Regimes
In this section, we compare equilibrium profits under compatibility and incom-
patibility. Matutes and Regibeau (1988) show that the profits under compatibility
are higher than those under incompatibility when n = 2.15 However, we show that
their conclusion is overturned when n ≥ 4.
The upper bound established in Lemma 2 is simply too loose to allow us to
show that the equilibrium profits under incompatibility are greater than those under
compatibility. But as shown in Propositions 1 and 2, the equilibrium profit under
compatibility converges to zero at a rate of n3 while the rate of convergence under
incompatibility is n2, provided that µ(F ∗n) is bounded above. Therefore, incompat-
ibility must be preferred by the firms for sufficiently large n. It turns out that such
n is not very large. Figure 5 shows the increasing trend of piIN(Jk
∗
n )/pi
C(n) where
Jk
∗
n is the profit-maximizing formation among all k-jump formations.
Proposition 3. For any n ≥ 4, there exists at least one symmetric formation under
incompatibility, which allows higher equilibrium profits than those under compatibil-
ity.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This result can be appreciated through the lens of Proposition 2, which states that
the equilibrium profit is inversely related to the m-to-d ratio. Under compatibility,
15As in our paper, the main analysis of Matutes and Regibeau (1988) focuses on two integrated
firms that offer both components, but they point out that the profits are independent of the com-
patibility regime if the two integrated firms are replaced by four independent single component
producers. In section 4, we consider the case of vertically separated firms that offer only one
component.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium profit ratio piIN (Jk
∗
n )/pi
C(n) as a function of n
the competition is at the component level, and firm i has two direct competitors,
with each of whom the firm shares a market boundary of length 1. Since the distance
between two systems is 1/n, the m-to-d ratio under compatibility is 2n. Note that
this specific m-to-d ratio can be generated under incompatibility as well by what can
be called a 0-jump or no jump formation in which all feasible systems are restricted
to lie on a horizontal line. However, firms can do much better than this under in-
compatibility by scattering their products more evenly over the characteristics space.
As shown above, there are configurations which shorten the market boundaries and
differentiate the systems more, which in turn softens price competition and increases
profits.
In Matutes and Regibeau (1988), the main difference between compatibility and
incompatibility in terms of price competition is the degree to which firms can appro-
priate the benefit of a price reduction; under compatibility, a reduction in the price
of component A produced by firm i will increase the market share not only of the
system produced by firm i, but also of the system of component A produced by firm
i and component B produced by its rival. In contrast, under incompatibility the
benefit of a price cut is fully captured by the firm. Therefore, price competition
is more intense under incompatibility, so firms prefer compatibility to incompatibil-
ity. In our model, another effect of compatibility manifests itself more clearly as
the number of firms grows larger. More systems are feasible under compatibility
(n2) than under incompatibility (n), which makes the market more crowded and the
systems less differentiated from each other. This effect grows larger as the number
16
of firms increases, and eventually dominates the effect demonstrated by Matutes and
Regibeau.
It is worth mentioning that for n = 2, our model generates the same result as
in Matutes and Regibeau (1988), i.e., the equilibrium profit under compatibility is
twice as large as that under incompatibility: piC(2) = t/4 while piIN(J12 ) = t/8.
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Our framework thus replicates the result in Matutes and Regibeau (1998) for the
duopoly case. However, we show that their result is reversed when the number of
firms is equal to or exceeds 4 as the product differentiation effect eventually domi-
nates the “internalization of price-cutting benefits” effect with an increase of n. A
recent working paper by Zhou (2014) derives a similar result to ours in the context
of pure bundling even though he adopts the random utility framework of Perloff
and Salop (1985) in contrast to our spatial competition model. He analyzes incen-
tives for bundling with an arbitrary number of firms and shows that under fairly
general conditions, bundling raises market prices compared to separate sales when
the number of firms exceeds a threshold level. Bundling and separate sales in his
model can be reinterpreted as incompatibility and compatibility across components
produced by different firms. This confirms that our main result is robust and not
model-specific.
The discussion so far suggests that incompatibility, which provides the smallest
number of varieties, is most likely to be the profit-maximizing compatibility configu-
ration among all possible compatibility regimes, including the ones not considered
in this paper. This is because as more systems are added to the market, a system
is likely to encounter more neighbors (i.e., directly competing systems) at nearer lo-
cations. In contrast, compatibility can be regarded as the welfare-maximizing form
of compatibility when the number of firms is fixed: given the assumption that every
consumer purchases a system good, the social welfare is completely determined by
the total “transportation costs,” which is minimized when the number of available
systems is maximized.
4. Vertically Separated Producers
Section 3 showed that for n large enough (i.e., n ≥ 4), incompatibility yields
higher equilibrium profits than compatibility when each firm produces both com-
ponent A and component B. In this section, we consider an alternative market
16When the market is served by vertically separated producers as assumed in Section 4, the firms
earn the identical profits (t/8) under both regimes, which is also the case in Matutes and Regibeau
(1988).
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structure, following Matutes and Regibeau (1988), in which each component pro-
ducer is an independent entity, and show that the main result derived above still
holds in this alternative market structure.
Matutes and Regibeau (1988) analyze compatibility incentives for two different
market structures. In one case, as in the model considered so far, a component A
producer is vertically integrated with a component B producer from the beginning.
In the other case, each component producer is assumed to be an independent entity,
and has to form an alliance with a partner company to make their products com-
patible. The integrated system providers set their component prices to maximize
the profits from both components, internalizing the effect of a price change in one
component on the sales of the other. In contrast, the vertically separated compo-
nent providers do not internalize such externalities. As explained at the end of the
previous section, an important effect of compatibility configuration is its effect on
the degree of internalization of price externalities. This effect, however, is absent in
a market with independent component producers because the firms do not internal-
ize the externalities under both compatibility and incompatibility. Thus, it is not
surprising that the key result in Section 3 reappears in a stronger form.
Proposition 4. Suppose both components of the system are provided by vertically
independent firms. Then, for any n ≥ 3, there exists at least one symmetric forma-
tion under incompatibility, which allows higher equilibrium profits than those under
compatibility.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition is immediate from noticing that individual firms’ first order
conditions are mathematically identical to the ones derived in the previous analysis.
This implies that the equilibrium component price under incompatibility is the same
as the equilibrium system price with integrated producers, whereas the prices remain
the same under compatibility. As a result, the system price under incompatibility
is doubled due to the change in the vertical structure. This is because under incom-
patibility each component producer ignores the effect of its price cut on the partner
firm’s demand, which results in double marginalization of system prices. However,
this is beneficial to producers in competitive environments because it relaxes price
competition as in Bonanno and Vickers (1988).
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examine private and social incentives for compatibility in a two-
dimensional spatial competition model of system markets. We show that there is a
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fundamental discrepancy between private and social incentives towards compatibility
among different vendors. Consumers find compatibility more attractive because it
allows more variety of systems, and they can easily find a system close to their ideal
specification on average. However, the availability of more variety under compati-
bility implies intensified competition and a lower profit for every firm in the market.
If the number of firms in a system market is fixed, then firms prefer incompatibility
to compatibility. However, social welfare is higher under compatibility.
We analyze the private incentives to achieve compatibility assuming the number
of firms in the industry is fixed. In the previous version of this paper, we have
also performed a long-run analysis in which the number of firms is endogenously
determined by the zero profit condition, assuming that the components are provided
by vertically independent firms.17 We can show that more firms enter under the
incompatibility regime due to higher profits compared to under the compatibility
regime.18 Nonetheless, the number of available systems is still higher under com-
patibility. This implies that compatibility is the optimal regime in the long-run as
well as in the short run because it provides more variety with less entry fixed costs.
We have not explicitly considered any costs involved in achieving a particular
form of compatibility. If there are differences in such costs across regimes, the
attractiveness of each regime would change in a predictable way. However, it is not
clear a priori which type of compatibility would be more costly. In cases where the
cost of forming an exclusive coalition (e.g., transaction costs involved in signing a
contract) is non-negligibly higher than the cost of establishing standards that would
ensure interoperability across all manufacturers, the firms may find compatibility
more attractive. However, in other cases the cost of achieving compatibility may be
higher than that of incompatibility.19
One shortcoming of our paper is that we consider only two possible compati-
bility regimes: compatibility and incompatibility. For the case of incompatibility,
we have not considered each firm’s incentive to deviate and build an alliance with
another firm. Suppose that every firm in the market decides to make their com-
17The details of the analysis are available from the authors.
18With vertically integrated firms, this result needs to be somewhat weakened because profits
under the compatibility regime is higher than profits under the incompatibility regime when n < 4.
However, we can state that there is a threshold value of fixed entry costs K such that nC ≤ nIN if
K ≤ K, where nC and nIN are the number of firms in the free-entry equilibrium under compatibility
and incompatibility, respectively, and K denotes entry costs.
19In the context of exclusive dealing, Besanko and Perry (1994) argue that exclusive dealing –
incompatibility in the context of our model – reduces the retailing cost such as the costs of inventory
and store space.
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ponents incompatible with its rivals’ products. Firm i may then have an incentive
to approach j and offer to build a new system (i, j) by making their components
compatible. If firm j accepts the offer, now there are two feasible systems in the
market whose component A is made by firm i. Even though the firm i may earn
a smaller profit from its own integrated system (i, i), the loss may be more than
made up by an additional source of revenue from system (i, j). A full analysis of
endogenous formation of coalitions that account for externalities among coalitions in
our model would be an important research agenda.20 In addition, an industry may
be partially compatible, or compatibility may run in only one direction in that some
firms’ component products can be used in combination with the rival firms’, but not
the other way around. For instance, Windows OS can be used in Mac computers
which allows for dual booting, but Mac OS may not be used with the PC. This type
of situation typically arises when firms are asymmetrically situated in the presence
of network externalities.21 An analysis of partial or one-way compatibility within a
general framework of n firms is beyond the scope of the current paper, but would be
a worthwhile extension.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. We first characterize symmetric first order conditions
using the m-to-d ratio, and then show that the first order condition should be satisfied
in equilibrium.
Suppose that given a symmetric formation Fn, firm i located at (x
A
i , x
B
i ) charges
Pi for its system good while the other firms charge P . When j is an element of Ni,
a consumer located at (xA, xB) is indifferent between system (i, i) and (j, j) if
t
(
xA − xAi
)2
+ t
(
xB − xBi
)2
+ Pi = t
(
xA − xAj
)2
+ t
(
xB − xBj
)2
+ P (A.1)
or equivalently,
2t
(
xAj − xAi
)
xA+2t
(
xBj − xBi
)
xB = P−Pi+t
((
xAj
)2 − (xAi )2)+t((xBj )2 − (xBi )2) .
Note that the above formula describes the market boundary that is orthogonal to
the line connecting system i and system j. To see how much the market boundary
moves in the direction of coordinate A as a response to a price change in Pi, we
20See Bloch (1996) and Yi (1997) for such an analysis.
21For an analysis of one-way compatibility, see Besen and Farrell (1994) and Katz and Shapiro
(1985).
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first fix xB. Then, it is clear that a small increase in Pi moves the market boundary
along coordinate A as much as ∂xA/∂Pi = −1/
[
2t
(
xAj − xAi
)]
. Now, let us define
a new coordinate which is orthogonal to the market boundary, and see how much
the boundary moves along this new coordinate. Letting x(i,j) be the projection of xA
onto the new coordinate, the following is immediate from the Pythagorean theorem.
∂x(i,j)
∂xA
=
xAj − xAi√(
xAj − xAi
)2
+
(
xBj − xBi
)2 = xAj − xAid(i, j)
Therefore, a small increase in Pi moves the market boundary toward its orthogonal
direction as much as
∂x(i,j)
∂Pi
=
∂x(i,j)
∂xA
∂xA
∂Pi
= − 1
2td(i, j)
.
Next, consider the response of the demand Di(Pi, P ) to a price change ∆Pi:
∆Di(Pi, P ) ≈
∑
j∈Ni
[
m (Pi, P ; (i, j)) ·∆x(i,j) + ∆m (Pi, P ; (i, j)) ·∆x(i,j)
]
where m (Pi, P ; (i, j)) is the length of the market boundary given the prices (Pi, P ),
∆x(i,j) is the amount that the market boundary moves toward its orthogonal di-
rection, and ∆m (Pi, P ; (i, j)) is the corresponding change in the market boundary.
Notice that when the price change is small, the second term in the square bracket is
of second order, and converges to zero faster than the first-order term in the limit. So
by dividing by ∆Pi and taking limits on both sides, we obtain the following formula.
∂Di(Pi, P )
∂Pi
=
∑
j∈Ni
m (Pi, P ; (i, j)) · ∂x(i,j)
∂Pi
= −
∑
j∈Ni
m (Pi, P ; (i, j))
2td(i, j)
(A.2)
On the other hand, the first order condition for firm i is
Pi
∂Di(Pi, P )
∂Pi
+Di(Pi, P ) = 0,
which can be rewritten after imposing the symmetry condition Pi = P = P
IN as
P IN = − Di(Pi, P )
∂Di(Pi, P )/∂Pi
∣∣∣∣
Pi=P=P IN
=
1
n
(∑
j∈Ni
m(i, j)
2td(i, j)
)−1
=
2t
nµ(Fn)
.
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The corresponding equilibrium profit is piIN(Fn) = 2t/[n
2µ(Fn)].
Let us turn our attention to the existence of equilibrium. If firm i sets Pi = 0, its
demand Di(Pi, P ) must be positive because P cannot be negative. By continuity of
the demand function, for small enough Pi the profit must be positive. Once again,
by the continuity and boundedness of Di(Pi, P ) along with the fact that the profit is
zero when Pi > v, the profit function has non-zero maximum with the best response
Pi(P ) ∈ (0, v]. Because all firms’ profit functions are identical and continuous, the
best response correspondences are continuous and symmetric. Therefore, there exists
at least one pure strategy symmetric equilibrium.
In the remainder of the proof, we show that there does not exist a local maximum
at which the profit function is not differentiable. This implies that the strategy
profile characterized above is the unique symmetric equilibrium because it is the
only symmetric solution of the first order conditions.
To prove the claim, we show that the demand function is convex in Pi. To this
end, we first prove that the market area is convex, i.e., if consumers located at
(xA, xB) and (x
′
A, x
′
B) purchase system (i, i), then a consumer located at (αxA + (1−
α)x′A, αxB + (1− α)x′B) for any α ∈ [0, 1] also purchases the same system. Suppose
both consumers at (xA, xB) and (x
′
A, x
′
B) buy system (i, i). For all (j, j) ∈ IC\{(i, i)},
the following inequalities are true.
v − t[(xA − xAi )2 + (xB − xBi )2]− Pi ≥ v − t[(xA − xAj )2 + (xB − xBj )2]− P
v − t[(x′A − xAi )2 + (x′B − xBi )2]− Pi ≥ v − t[(x′A − xAj )2 + (x′B − xBj )2]− P
Rearranging terms, the conditions can be rewritten as
(P − Pi)/t ≥ (xAi − xAj )(2xA − xAj − xAi ) + (xBi − xBj )(2xB − xBj − xBi )
(P − Pi)/t ≥ (xAi − xAj )(2x′A − xAj − xAi ) + (xBi − xBj )(2x′B − xBj − xBi ).
Summing up the above inequalities after multiplying by α and (1− α) respectively,
we have
(P−Pi)/t ≥ (xAi −xAj ) [2 (αxA + (1− α)x′A)− xg − xi]+(xj−xh) [2 (αxB + (1− α)x′B)− xh − xj] ,
which implies that (i, i) is the best choice for any consumer located on the segment
connecting (xA, xB) and (x
′
A, x
′
B). Therefore, the total length of the market bound-
aries is monotonically decreasing as Pi increases. This, in turn, implies the derivative
of the demand (∂Di(Pi, P )/∂Pi) is increasing (see equation (A.2)) in Pi, i.e., the de-
mand function is convex in Pi. Note that there does not exist a non-differentiable
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local maximum of PiD(Pi) if D(Pi) is a convex function. Therefore, in the unique
symmetric equilibrium, the first order condition derived above should hold.
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) By definition, there is a line of slope k on which all the
products in IC lie. Let us call this line L. In R2 representation, infinitely many
L’s lie equidistantly from each other by the property of (xA, xB) ∼ (xA + 1, xB) ∼
(xA, xB +1). Furthermore, since the systems are distributed regularly on each line, if
a product finds a competing product on one side, it must find another on the exactly
opposite side. This means that if we draw a line connecting any two systems and
beyond, we would encounter a third system, and the distance between the first and
the second is the same as that between the second and the third. See Figure 4 for a
concrete picture.
(ii) By result (i), the shape of a market area generated by a k-jump formation
should be either rectangular, hexagonal, octagonal, or 2a-gonal for a ≥ 5. We first
show that it is not possible that a market area is shaped as an octagon. To see this,
suppose that there exists (n, k) such that given n, a k-jump formation generates
an octagon-shaped market area. Since the market area is convex as shown in the
proof of Proposition 2, each interior angle of the octagon must be smaller than 180◦.
Thus, three or more vertices are required to complete one 360◦. In addition, in tiling
the torus (R2 plane), each vertex of the octagon should participate only once, and
all together eight vertices should make three complete 360◦ because the sum of the
interior angles is 180 × (8 − 2) = 1080 = 360 × 3. However, it is easy to see that
when we divide the eight vertices into three disjoint sets, there is always a set which
has only two or less elements. This contradicts the condition that each interior angle
is smaller than 180◦. By the same token, for a ≥ 5, one can check that 2a vertices
cannot be distributed into a − 1 disjoint sets without allowing at least one set to
have two or less elements.
Proof of Lemma 2. We characterize an upper bound of µ(F ∗n) using a k-jump
formation. Note that when n is larger than or equal to 4, in any k-jump formation
with k ≥ 2, eight products nearby the focused product are potential neighbors. (See
Figure 4.) Since the number of market boundaries is either four or six by (ii) in
Lemma 1, at least two products out of the eight cannot participate in forming the
market boundaries.
Let ko = d
√
ne, the largest integer that is smaller than or equal to √n, and
consider a ko-jump formation. Suppose that product i is located at the origin.
We then label the product at (1/n, ko/n) as the first system and the product at
(2/n, 2ko/n) as the second system, and so on. Then, since k
2
o ≤ n, or equiva-
lently (ko + 1)ko/n ≤ 1 + ko/n, for the (ko + 1)st system from the origin which
is at ((ko + 1) /n, (ko + 1)ko/n), the maximum distance from the horizontal axis is
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ko/n because ((ko + 1) /n, 1 + ko/n) ∼ ((ko + 1) /n, ko/n). Note that potentially the
(ko − 1)st, ktho , and (ko + 1)st system can participate in building a market boundary
around i. (See Figure 4. In this case, q = ko and r = n − k2o .) Thus, the distance
between i and a neighboring system of i cannot be larger than
√
(ko + 1)2 + k2o/n,
which is the distance between the origin and (ko + 1)
st system when ko =
√
n. At
the same time, it cannot be smaller than ko/n, which is the distance from the origin
to the ktho system when ko =
√
n.
For any rectangle, the longest distance between two edges is equal to the length
of the longest edge. For any hexagon, the longest distance between two edges is
longer than or equal to the longest edge by the triangle inequality. In other words,
every market boundary is shorter than or equal to the longest distance between
two neighboring systems. Thus, each ratio of a market boundary to the associated
distance must be smaller than or equal to
√
(ko + 1)2 + k2o/n over ko/n:
µ(F ∗n) ≤ µ(Jkon ) < 6 ·
√
(ko + 1)2 + k2o/n
ko/n
=
6
√
2k2o + 2ko + 1
ko
≤ 3
√
13
where the last inequality comes from the fact that 6
√
2k2o + 2ko + 1/ko is decreasing
in ko, and is 3
√
13 when ko = 2.
For the cases of n = 2 and 3, one can easily confirm that µ(J1n) = 4 < 3
√
13.
Proof of Proposition 3. By Lemma 2, the ratio of the equilibrium profit under
incompatibility to that under compatibility is larger than n/3
√
13, which implies
that the ratio is greater than 1 for n > 10. To complete the proof, we only need to
consider the case where 4 ≤ n ≤ 10, and show that piIN(F ∗n) ≥ piC(n) as follows.
piIN(J24 ) = t/28 > t/32 = pi
C(4) piIN(J25 ) = t/50 > 2t/125 = pi
C(5)
piIN(J26 ) = t/66 > t/108 = pi
C(6) piIN(J27 ) = t/98 > 2t/343 = pi
C(7)
piIN(J38 ) = t/112 > t/256 = pi
C(8) piIN(J39 ) = t/144 > 2t/729 = pi
C(9)
piIN(J410) = t/190 > t/500 = pi
C(10)
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider first the case of incompatibility. Suppose that
given a symmetric formation Fn, firm i located at x
A
i forms a coalition with firm j
located at xBj , and charges pi for its component good while the other firms (including
firm j) charge p. Denote N(i,j) as the set of neighbors of system (i, j). When (g, h)
is an element of N(i,j), a consumer located at (xA, xB) is indifferent between system
(i, j) and (g, h) if
t
(
xA − xAi
)2
+ t
(
xB − xBj
)2
+ pi + p = t
(
xA − xAg
)2
+ t
(
xB − xBh
)2
+ 2p.
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Notice that this condition is virtually identical with equation (A.1), which implies the
demand for component Amade by firm i would also be identical withDi(pi, p) derived
in the proof of Proposition 2. The first order condition would also be identical. Thus,
the equilibrium prices of each component here are exactly the same as those of the
system prices charged by vertically integrated firms. On the other hand, under
compatibility, the intensity of competition is not affected by the vertical structure of
the industry, meaning that the profit for a component producer is half of that for an
integrated system producer.
In short, under incompatibility each component producer earns as much as piIN(Fn),
whereas under compatibility they earn piC(n)/2. When n = 3, the maximum
profit under incompatibility is piIN(J13 ) = pi
IN(J23 ) = t/18, and under compatibil-
ity piC(3)/2 = t/27. Therefore, even for n = 3, there exists a symmetric formation
under incompatibility that yields a higher equilibrium profit than that under com-
patibility.
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